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The finding ofprobable cause is a well-established requirement in
criminal proceedings, but not in juvenile proceedings. States have
adopted this requirement only in varying degrees in their statutes and
case law relating tojuveniles. In this Article, Professor Davis examines
the needfor a probable cause requirement in the various stages of the
juvenile process. Throughout the Article, he supplements his discussion
with a review of the standards relating to the juvenile justice process
developed by the Juvenile Justice Standards Project and recently ap-
proved by the American Bar Association. Professor Davis concludes
that a probable cause requirement should be an integral part of the
juvenile process. He feels this is necessary to protect the rights of
juveniles, deterpotential prosecutorial abuses, and insure that thepref-
erence for treating children as children, in juvenile courts, and not as
adults, in criminal courts, is observed
The requirement that the prosecution establish probable cause to believe
the accused committed the offense charged is a well-established requirement
in criminal proceedings. This requirement has several purposes, which in-
clude establishing a basis for issuance of an arrest warrant' or for making an
arrest without a warrant,2 establishing a basis for return of a grand jury indict-
ment,3 and establishing a basis for continued detention of a person arrested
without an arrest warrant.4 In the criminal process the probable cause re-
quirement is the essential element of a preliminary hearing, which performs a
number of important functions. Among them is a screening function designed
to separate cases with prosecutive merit from those that either lack a sufficient
evidentiary basis for prosecution or result from malice or improvidence.5 The
required evidentiary showing also serves a discovery function, because the ac-
cused will learn a portion of the evidence against him and will be able to cross
examine the prosecution's witnesses.
6
t Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. B.A. 1966, University of South-
ern Mississippi; J.D. 1969, University of Mississippi; LL.M. 1970, University of Virginia.
1. See generally Jaben v. United States, 381 U.S. 214 (1965); Giordenello v. United States,
357 U.S. 480 (1958).
2. See generally Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89 (1964); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98
(1959); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
3. See, ag., Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 935 (1965); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 112-
4(d) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-628(a)(1) (1978).
4. See, eg., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
5. Thies v. State, 178 Wis. 98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922).
6. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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In contrast, the probable cause requirement has not enjoyed the same
utility in the juvenile process, except in limited circumstances. For example,
some states require a finding of probable cause as a condition for waiver of
juvenile court jurisdiction and transfer to criminal court,7 or to establish a
basis for filing a delinquency petition in juvenile court.8 The Juvenile Justice
Standards Project,9 however, recommends that probable cause be a requisite
finding for several purposes, including establishing the legal sufficiency of a
complaint'0 or petition," 1 establishing a basis for continued detention pending
a hearing, 12 and meeting the threshold conditions for waiver of jurisdiction
and transfer to criminal court.' 3 The purpose of this Article is to analyze the
desirability of a probable cause requirement in juvenile proceedings and in
criminal proceedings in which the defendant is a child (that is, a person within
the age jurisdiction of the juvenile court).
Ideally, the juvenile court should be given exclusive original jurisdiction
over all children charged with any offense, with the option in exceptional cases
of waiving jurisdiction and transferring these cases to criminal court for crimi-
nal prosecution.' 4 Occasionally, however, even though the accused is a
child, 15 a case may originate in criminal court, either because certain serious
7. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(3)(i) (1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 119,
§ 61 (West Supp. 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-608 to -610 (Supp. 1979); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-
20-34(1)(b)(4)(a) (Supp. 1979); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(2) (Baldwin 1978); VA. CODE
§ 16.1-269(A)(3)(a) (Supp. 1980).
8. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-9(b) (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.28(6)
(West Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-530 to -531 (Supp. 1979).
9. INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION AND AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUVENILE
JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT (1977) [hereinafter cited as JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS]. The
Juvenile Justice Standards Project was a cooperative effort of the Institute of Judicial Administra-
tion and the American Bar Association. The result of the Project's efforts was a multivolume set
of standards that were intended to be to the juvenile justice process what the Standards Relating
to Criminal Justice were to the criminal process. Most of these standards were approved by the
ABA at its mid-year meeting in 1979. The remainder, with the exception of one volume, were
approved at the ABA's mid-year meeting in 1980. All of the standards to which reference is made
in this Article have been approved by the ABA.
10. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION,
STANDARD 4.1; see id, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION, STAN-
DARD 2.7.
11. See id, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, STANDARD 4.1(A);
i d, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION, STANDARDS 4.2,4.6; id, STANDARDS RELATING TO
ADJUDICATION, STANDARD l.1(B).
12. Id, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, STANDARD 4.1(B); id,
STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS, STANDARD 7.6(F); id, STANDARDS RELATING TO
PROSECUTION, STANDARD 4.6.
13. Id, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, STANDARD 4. 1(B); id.
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 2.2(A)(1); id, STANDARDS
RELATING TO PROSECUTION, STANDARD 4.6.
14. Davis, The Jursdictional Dilemma of the Juvenile Court, 51 N.C.L. REV. 195, 200-02
(1972); see generally Whitebread & Batey, Transfer Between Courts: Proposals of the Juvenile Jus-
tice Standards Project, 63 VA. L. REv. 221 (1977).
15. "Child" is used here in the sense that the accused is a person within the maximum age
jurisdiction of the juvenile court, which usually is set at 18, see e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.015(2) (West 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-517(20), -524 (Cum. Supp. 1979), but occasion-
ally is set lower, see e.g., TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. § 5 1.02(1) (Vernon 1975) (17), or higher, see e,.,
Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-1-101, 14-6-201(a)(iii) (1978) (19). For a complete discussion of age as a juris-
dictional element in juvenile proceedings, see S. DAVIS, RIOHT OF JUVENILES: THE JUVENILE
JUSTICE SYSTEM 2-1 (1980).
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offenses are excluded from the juvenile court's jurisdiction, 16 the juvenile and
criminal courts are granted concurrent jurisdiction over certain offenses, 17 the
prosecutor has discretion to determine the court in which the case will be han-
dled, 8 or certain offenses by law originate in the criminal court, which has the
option to transfer appropriate cases to juvenile court.' 9
In all of the above jurisdictional settings the prosecutor exercises enor-
mous discretion, whether such discretion is expressly granted or not. For ex-
ample, if a particular offense is excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, the prosecutor may elect to charge the child with such an offense even
though the evidence in the case will only support, at most, a lesser charge.
Once the case originates in criminal court, jurisdiction remains in the criminal
court even though the child pleads guilty to or is convicted of a lesser offense
over which the juvenile court would have exercised original jurisdiction. By
electing to charge the more serious offense initially, the prosecutor can avoid
the necessity of a waiver hearing in juvenile court. The same result can be
achieved when the criminal and juvenile courts exercise concurrent jurisdic-
Age, however, is only one factor that determines which court will exercise jurisdiction over a
child. The other factor is conduct, that is, the offense with which the child is charged. This juris-
dictional element is covered in notes 16-19 and accompanying text infra.
16. See, eg., DEL. CODE tit. 10 §§ 921(2)(a), 938(a)(1) (1974 & Supp. 1980); (excludes first
degree murder, rape, and kidnapping); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5) (West Supp. 1980)
(excludes murder, manslaughter, and aggravated rape committed by juvenile 15 or older, and
armed robbery, aggravated burglary, and aggravated kidnapping committed by juvenile 16 or
older); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (Cum. Supp. 1979) (excludes capital offenses committed by
juvenile over 14).
17. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-417, -418 (Supp. 1979); id § 45-420 (1977); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.02(5)(c) (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301(b) (1976); MICH. CoMp. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.2(d) (Supp. 1980); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202(3)(b)-(c) (1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN § 26-11-3 (1976); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-6-203 (c), -211 (1978).
18. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-418 (Supp. 1979); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-202.01 (1978);
Wvo. STAT. §§ 14-6-203(c), -211 (1978). In the District of Columbia the prosecutor in effect has
discretion to treat certain cases as either juvenile or criminal matters. If he elects to "charge" the
child with one of certain enumerated offenses, the child is no longer a "child" within the meaning
of the juvenile court code and is prosecuted as an adult. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2301(3)(A) (1973);
Pendergrast v. United States, 332 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1975). Similarly, in Florida, if a child is alleged
to have committed an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, the prosecutor can elect
to prosecute the case in criminal court by seeking an indictment. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5)(c)
(West Supp. 1979).
19. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(d)(1), (4) (1980); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 594A (Supp. 1980) (transfer to juvenile court allowed for child 14 or older charged with
offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, or 16 or older charged with robbery with a
deadly weapon or attempted robbery with a deadly weapon); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21.105(j),
43-21-159(3) (Supp. 1980) (transfer to juvenile court allowed for child charged with offense pun-
ishable by death or life imprisonment); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1980);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10(18), 30 (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y. CIUM. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75,
190.71,210.43, 220.10(5)(g) (McKinney Supp. 1980) (transfer to juvenile court allowed for child 13
or older but less than 16 charged with second degree murder, or child 14 or older but less than 16
charged with one of certain enumerated offenses); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104.2 (West Supp.
1980) (transfer to juvenile court allowed for child 16 or older charged with one of certain enumer-
ated offenses); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6302, 6322(a) (Purdon 1980) (transfer to juvenile court
allowed for child charged with murder); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, §§ 632(a)(1), 635(b) (Supp. 1980)
(maximum age for original juvenile court jurisdiction over delinquent children is 16; criminal
court has discretion to transfer to juvenile court a person over 16 but under 18 years of age at the
time the offense allegedly was committed).
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tion over certain offenses or when certain cases, because of the seriousness of
the offense or the age of the child, must originate in criminal court.
Even if a case originates in juvenile court the prosecutor exercises consid-
erable discretion. He can, for example, charge a more serious offense than is
warranted by the evidence for the purpose of persuading the child to enter an
admission (guilty plea) to a lesser offense in juvenile court or for the purpose
of qualifying the case for waiver ofjurisdiction, when one of the conditions for
waiver is that the child is alleged to have committed a serious offense, for
example, a felony. In the latter instance, if the case is transferred to criminal
court, it will be handled as a criminal matter even though the child may plead
guilty to or be convicted of a less serious offense over which the juvenile court
could not have waived its jurisdiction.
A waiver hearing in juvenile court, at least if a required condition is that
the prosecutor establish probable cause to believe the child has committed the
offense charged, is an adequate safeguard against prosecutorial abuse. But in
most of the other hypothetical settings mentioned above, no safeguards against
abuse presently exist in most states. The problem is serious because if abuse
does occur in the manner mentioned, it operates to overcome policies of pref-
erence that are inherent in the juvenile court concept, including the preference
that a child be treated as a child rather than as an adult, and the preference
that a child be released to the custody of a parent or guardian pending a hear-
ing rather than be detained. A required probable cause finding-in criminal
court and in juvenile court-can minimize the incidence of abuse and help
assure that discretionary decision making takes place at a level of high visibil-
ity.
I. PROBABLE CAUSE AS A BASIS FOR FILING A PETITION
An action against a child or in a child's interests, whether based on condi-
tions of neglect or abandonment or conduct indicating delinquency or a need
for supervision, is commenced in juvenile court by the filing of a petition.
20
Typically, statutes provide that when the court or appropriate agency receives
a complaint or report that a child has committed an offense or for whatever
reason is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, a preliminary inquiry is
conducted. On completion of the preliminary inquiry the court or agency may
authorize a petition to be filed. 2 1 Generally, however, all that need be estab-
lished by the preliminary inquiry is that the interests of the child or the public
20. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 31-6-4-9, 31-6-4-10
(Bums 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.35(1), 232.87(1) (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REv. STAT.
§ 208.070 (1980); LA. CODE Juv. PROC. art. 45 (West 1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A. 11
(1968); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.131 (West 1971 & Supp. 1980); MIss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-451
(Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-501 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-14 (1978); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-531 (Supp. 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.482 (1979).
21. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020(a) (1979); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.28(1), (2),
232.35(2) (West Supp. 1980); Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.070(1) (1977); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 712A.1 1 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-351, 43-21-357(1), (2) (Supp. 1980); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 41-5-301(1), (5)(c) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32-1-14(A), (C) (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 7A-531 (Supp. 1979); OR. REv. STAT. § 419A82(2) (1979).
[Vol. 59
JUVENILE PROCEEDINGS
require that a petition be filed. 22
For a child alleged to be delinquent, some statutes require a finding of
probable cause to believe the child committed the delinquent act before filing
of a petition is authorized.23 At least one court has held, however, that a find-
ing of probable cause is not required by due process of law or equal protection
of the laws.24 In so holding, the court found the complaint in juvenile pro-
ceedings comparable to a complaint in the criminal process and the petition
comparable to an information or indictment.
25
The Juvenile Justice Standards contain a number of provisions related to
the requirement that a petition have a legally sufficient basis. In typical fash-
ion, the Standards provide that formal proceedings are commenced by the
filing of a petition.26 Before a petition is authorized to be filed, however, the
intake officer, upon receipt of a complaint, must determine whether the com-
plaint is legally sufficient to warrant filing a petition. This decision is reached
after reviewing the contents of the complaint and conducting a preliminary
investigation to determine whether the complaint is legally sufficient to estab-
lish the court's jurisdiction and whether the competent and credible evidence
is legally sufficient to support the charge against the child. The intake officer is
authorized to dismiss the complaint if its lacks legal sufficiency on either of
these bases. If the intake officer is uncertain of the legal sufficiency of the
complaint, he should refer it to the prosecutor for a determination of legal
sufficiency.
27
If the intake officer determines that the complaint is legally sufficient, a
report requesting that a petition be filed is submitted to the prosecutor, who
makes the decision whether or not to file a petition. In the event the prosecu-
tor elects not to file a petition, the decision is final and not appealable. If the
intake officer initially determines that a petition should not be filed, the deci-
sion and reasons therefor are reported to the complainant. The complainant
may request review of the decision by the prosecutor, who may decide that a
petition should be filed. Because the final decision on whether a petition
should be filed belongs to the prosecutor, he may elect to fie a petition even in
the absence of a request for review by the complainant.
28
Following the filing of a petition, the prosecutor may determine upon a
review of the evidence that the evidence is insufficient under applicable rules
to establish the legal sufficiency of the petition. In this event the Standards
22. See, eg., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.020(a) (1979); Ky. REv. STAT. § 208.070(1) (1980);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 712A.I1 (1968); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-357(1) (Supp. 1980);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-301(4)(b)(1) (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-1-14(A) (1978); OR. REV.
STAT. § 419.482(2) (1979).
23. See, ag., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-4-9(b) (Burns 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 232.28(6),
232.35(2) (West Supp. 1980). Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-531 (Supp. 1979) (reasonable grounds).
24. In re Maricopa County, 122 Ariz. 252, 255-56, 594 P.2d 506, 509-10 (1979).
25. Id at 254, 594 P.2d at 508.
26. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION,
STANDARD 1.1(A).
27. Id STANDARDS RELATING TO THE JUVENILE PROBATION FUNCTION, STANDARD 2.7.
28. Id STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION, STANDARD 4.1.
1981]
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call for the prosecutor to move to withdraw the petition.29 The Standards fur-
ther provide that, absent the consent of the prosecutor, a petition should not be
dismissed once it has been filed, except by the court on its own motion in the
interests ofjustice.30 This latter exception admits of a broad judicial review of
the sufficiency of the petition. Moreover, the Standards specifically provide
that if the legal sufficiency of the petition is challenged, the court should rule
on the sufficiency challenge before receiving the child's plea.31 Furthermore,
the Standards provide for a judicial determination of probable cause by re-
quiring the prosecutor to present evidence sufficient to establish probable
cause at the child's first appearance in court.32
Thus, while most current statutes do not require that the petition be sup-
ported by evidence establishing probable cause to believe the child committed
the acts alleged in the petition,33 the Juvenile Justice Standards contain nu-
merous safeguards at different stages of the proceedings to assure that the peti-
tion has a legally sufficient basis. These requirements assure that only those
cases with prosecutive merit reach the formal adjudicative stage of the pro-
ceedings. If an intake officer were allowed to make the final determination to
file a petition, such a determination might be nothing more than a therapeutic
decision that the child is in need of services, without regard to whether the
child committed the alleged act. A prosecutor is more likely to be concerned
with the legal sufficiency of the evidence to establish probable cause; therefore
the prosecutor is authorized to make the final determination of whether or not
to fie a petition.34
Although it might be said that a prosecutorial determination of legal suffi-
ciency of a petition does not constitute an unbiased review, the Standards
clearly provide for final determination of probable cause by the court. Aside
from providing for a judicial determination of probable cause at the child's
first appearance in court,35 the Standards state that a child has a right to a
judicial determination of probable cause if an adjudicatory hearing is not held
within five days from the filing of a petition when the child remains in cus-
tody, or within fifteen days when the child is not in detention. 36 Unless a
probable cause determination has been made in connection with an earlier
preliminary hearing or appearance, ordinarily detention or transfer hearings
should commence with consideration of the probable cause issue.37
29. Id STANDARD 4.2.
30. Id STANDARD 4.5(A).
31. Id STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, STANDARD 1.1(B).
32. Id STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION, STANDARD 4.6.
33. See statutes cited note 22 supra.
34. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, upra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION,
STANDARD 4.1, Commentary, at 53-54.
35. Id STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, STANDARD 1.1(B); id STANDARDS RE-
LATING TO PROSECUTION, STANDARD 4.6.




II. PROBABLE CAUSE AS A BASIS FOR CONTINUED DETENTION
A number of states grant children in juvenile proceedings the same right
to bail accorded adults in criminal proceedings, 38 or at least authorize release
on bail in the discretion of the court before which the child is brought.
39
Other states, however, mostly as a result ofjudicial decision, have determined
that children do not have a right to release on bail.40 The expanding role of
the Constitution in juvenile proceedings may require that juveniles be afforded
the right to release on bail to the extent it is enjoyed by adults. Arguably,
however, bail should not be accorded to a child as a matter of right, not be-
cause of a characterization ofjuvenile proceedings as civil rather than criminal
in nature,4 1 but because the child may be in need of care, supervision, or pro-
tection that might be denied him without proper inquiry into the conditions
and environment into which he will be released. For example, if released on
bail as a matter of right, the child might be returned to the very same environ-
ment that caused his referral to juvenile court in the first place.42
Because due process does not necessarily entitle children to all rights ac-
corded adults in criminal proceedings, 43 a separate system of release for chil-
dren in juvenile proceedings, with sufficient safeguards, might be viewed as
not only an adequate but a preferable alternative to release on bail, consistent
with due process of law. Moreover, an alternative system of release for chil-
dren arguably is free of equal protection objections because of the demonstra-
38. See, eg., COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-103(7) (1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-1402(d) (Supp.
1980); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 67 (West Supp. 1981); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 11 12(c) (West Supp. 1979-80); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 26-8-21 (1976); W. VA. CODE § 49-
5-1(b) (1980); State v. Franklin, 202 La. 439, 12 So. 2d 211 (1943). At least one federal court has
agreed. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F. Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
39. See, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260.171(1) (West Supp. 1980); NEB. REv. STAT. § 43-
205.03 (1974); TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-217(e) (Supp. 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 641(c) (Supp.
1980).
40. See, eg., Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923) (current statute, however, ap-
pears to grant discretionary authority to release on bail, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-131 (West
Supp. 1980)); A.N.E. v. State, 156 So. 2d 525 (Fla. Ct. App. 1963); Pauley v. Gross, 1 Kan. App. 2d
736, 574 P.2d 234 (1977); In re Martin, 9 N.C App 576, 176 S.E.2d 849 (1970); State ex rel Peaks
v. Allaman, 51 Ohio Op. 321, 115 N.E.2d 849 (Ohio Ct. App. 1952); Expare Espinosa, 144 Tex.
121, 188 S.W.2d 576 (1945); Estes v. Hopp, 73 Wash. 2d 263, 438 P.2d 205 (1968) (despite statutory
provision that implies availability of bail to juveniles, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.115
(1962)); HAwAii REV. STAT. § 571-32(h) (Supp. 1980); OR. REv. STAT. § 419.583 (1979); see also
People ex ret Wayburn v. Schupf, 47 App. Div. 2d 79, 365 N.Y.S.2d 235 (1975) (Family Court is
without power to fix bail for juveniles because Family Court Act does not mention bail for
juveniles and in lieu thereof provides for alternative system of release). Cf. Exparte Newkosky,
94 NJ.L. 314, 116 A. 716 (N.J. 1920) (requirements of indictment by gand jury and trial by jury
not applicable to juvenile proceedings). Most of these cases were decided prior to In re Ganlt, 387
U.S. 1 (1967), in which the Supreme Court held juveniles entitled to the due process protections of
adequate notice of charges against them, id at 33-34, right to counsel, id at 41, confrontation and
cross-examination of witnesses, and the privilege against self-incrimination, id at 55-56, in juve-
nile proceedings. Gault and its progeny cause one to question the continued validity of these
cases.
41. This distinction was drawn by many courts in pre-Gault cases as a basis for denying the
rioht to bail to children in juvenile proceedings. The Gault Court, however, refused to make this
distinction, noting that incarceration against one's will is the same whether the proceedings lead-
ing to it are classified as "civil" or "criminal." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 (1967).
42. See Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 552 (1957).
43. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
NORTH CAROLINA L4W REVIEW
ble differences between children and adults in terms of age, maturity,
responsibility, and self-restraint, and because of the overriding interest of the
state in protecting children.44
As an alternative system of release, most states provide for notification of
parents when a child is taken into custody and release of the child into paren-
tal custody upon the parent's promise to produce the child in court at the ap-
pointed time.45 This release usually is stated as a preference, and if the child is
to be detained pending a hearing, detention is authorized only in special cases,
such as when it is necessary to protect the person or property of the child or
others, when there is a likelihood that the child will flee if released, or when
the child has no parent or guardian in whose custody he could be released.
46
An example might suffice to illustrate the protective features that an alter-
native system of release for children should possess. In In re William M. ,47 the
California Supreme Court discussed the subject of release of children and,
without reaching the right to bail issue, concluded that the liberal release pro-
visions of the state's juvenile court act, when properly administered, offer an
adequate system of release from custody.48 One of the provisions to which the
court referred indicates a preference that a child be released rather than de-
tained, following his being taken into custody.49 Another indicates that if the
child is not released immediately following his being taken into custody, a
petition must be filed against him, and a detention hearing must be held
within one judicial day following filing of the petition.50 A third provision
states the responsibility of the court at the detention hearing:
The court will examine such minor, his parent, guardian, or other
person having relevant knowledge, hear such relevant evidence as
the minor, his parent or guardian or their counsel desires to present,
and, unless it appears that such minor has violated an order of the
juvenile court or has escaped from the commitment of the juvenile
court or that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the
protection of such minor or reasonably necessary for the protection
of the person or property of another that he be detained or that such
minor is likely to flee to avoid the jurisdiction of the court, the court
44. See People exrel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 39 N.Y.2d 682, 350 N.E.2d 906, 385 N.Y.S.2d 518
(1976).
45. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-2-4 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 260.171 (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 724 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1980); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-572(1)-(2), -577(e)(1) (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 48.19(2), 48.20 (West
Supp. 1980).
46. See, eg., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-815(b) (1980); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32-
1-24 (1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-574 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 48.205(1) (West 1979 &
Supp. 1980); UNIFORM JUVENILE COURT Acr § 14 (1968).
47. 3 Cal. 3d 16, 473 P.2d 737, 89 Cal. Rptr. 33 (1970).
48. Id. at 26 n.17, 473 P.2d at 744 n.17, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 40 n.17.
49. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 626 (West Supp. 1980).
50. Id. § 632. For a child taken into custody without a warrant for a misdemeanor violation,
the detention hearing must be held before the expiration of the next judicial day or within 48




shall make its order releasing such minor from custody.5 1
The child in William M., who was taken into custody for an alleged sale
of marijuana, was not initally released into the custody of his parents, so a
detention hearing was held. At the hearing the child's counsel offered evi-
dence favoring his release, but the court refused to hear the evidence, stating
that it was the policy of the court automatically to detain all children charged
with a drug-related offense. The court stated, "The Legislature must have
thought it was serious, it is five years to life if he were an adult," to which
counsel replied, "If he were an adult, he would be out on bail at this very
moment." The court's response to this observation was, "If you want to have
him handled as an adult, I will certify him to adult court and you can bail him
out. ... "52
The California Supreme Court strongly disapproved of this abuse of the
procedures set up for release of children. The court indicated that detention
should be the exception rather than the rule and that in cases in which the
child is not released initially by the police officer or probation officer and a
detention hearing is thereafter held, the probation officer bears the burden of
presenting sufficient evidence to warrant continued detention.53 In order to
demonstrate the "immediate and urgent necessity" for detention required by
the statute, the officer must present a prima facie case that the alleged offense
was committed by the child.
54
The California provisions outlined above set forth sufficient safeguards to
protect the rights of a child if, as the court pointed out, they are properly ad-
ministered. The police officer who first takes the child into custody may re-
lease the child on his own or release him to his parents.55 His only alternative
is to refer the child immediately to a probation officer.56 The probation officer
in turn is authorized to release the child into the custody of his parents.57 It is
expected that by this point most children will have been released. If the pro-
bation officer feels detention is required, however, a detention hearing must be
held within one judicial day, and the child should be released unless good
cause is shown to indicate otherwise.58 The probation officer bears the respon-
sibility of demonstrating that the child falls within the special circumstances in
which continued detention is authorized.
5 9
The California court's decision is exceptional in requiring as part of an
ordinary detention hearing a prima facie showing that the child committed the
offense alleged. The decision may have been prophetic, however, because to-
51. Id. § 635.
52. 3 Cal. 3d at 21-22, 473 P.2d at 740, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
53. Id. at 28, 473 P.2d at 745, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
54. Id. at 26-28 & n.20, 473 P.2d at 744-46 & n.20, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 40-42 & n.20.
55. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 626 (West Supp. 1980).
56. Id.
57. Id. § 628.
58. Id. §§ 632, 635.
59. 3 Cal. 3d at 28,473 P.2d at 745, 89 Cal. Rptr. at 41. See also TE.x. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3,
§ 54.01 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1980); People ex rel. Wayburn v. Schupf, 47 A.D.2d 79, 365
N.Y.S.2d 235 (1975).
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day an additional safeguard applicable to children is the constitutional re-
quirement of a probable cause hearing if a child remains in custody pending
an adjudicatory hearing. In Moss v. Weaver 60 the Fifth Circuit held that, in
light of the Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein v. Pugh,61 the preadjudi-
catory detention of a child without a finding of probable cause is a violation of
the fourth amendment. 62 In Gerstein v. Pugh the Court held that a person
arrested without a warrant or against whom no indictment has been returned
may not be detained constitutionally prior to trial without a hearing to deter-
mine if there is probable cause to believe the person committed the crime
charged.63 The Fifth Circuit's decision applied the same fourth amendment
safeguard to children, although it held, consistent with Gerstein v. Pugh, that
the required hearing does not have to be an adversary proceeding with the full
panoply of rights.64
Other courts likewise have held that in juvenile proceedings children are
constitutionally entitled to a probable cause hearing in any situation in which
an adult would be entitled to one.65 Although in two of these cases the chil-
dren had detention hearings, both courts held that more was required.66 An
ordinary detention hearing simply determines whether reasons such as protec-
tion of the public or the child himself require that he remain in detention
pending an adjudicatory hearing. A probable cause hearing requires that suf-
ficient facts and circumstances be shown to indicate the probability that the
child committed the offense charged. Of course, a single hearing combining
both purposes could be held, but the probable cause finding would appear to
be a threshold requirement.
67
A probable cause finding, aside from often being required by the fourth
amendment, is sometimes required by statute, usually in conjunction with a
detention hearing.68 The Juvenile Justice Standards express a strong prefer-
ence that a child be released rather than detained 69 and further provide that if
a child is not released initially, a petition for a detention hearing should be
filed within twenty-four hours of the time the child is taken into custody,70 and
a detention hearing should be held within twenty-four hours of the filing of
60. 525 F.2d 1258 (5th Cir. 1976).
61. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
62. 525 F.2d at 1260.
63. 420 U.S. at 114.
64. 525 F.2d at 1260-61.
65. See, eg., Bell v. Superior Court, 117 Ariz. 551, 554, 574 P.2d 39, 42 (Ct. App. 1977); State
ex rel. Joshua, 327 So. 2d 429, 429 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 329 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1976).
66. Moss v. Weaver, 525 F.2d 1258, 1260 (5th Cir. 1976); State exrel. Joshua, 327 So. 2d 429,
429 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 329 So. 2d 450, 456 (La. 1976).
67. See, eg., IowA CODE ANN. § 232.22(1) (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 3203(5)(D) (1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-609 (Supp. 1979).
68. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.22(1) (West Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15,
§ 3203(5)(D) (1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-609 (Supp. 1979).
69. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO INTERIM STA-
TUs, STANDARDS 3.1, 5.1. The Standards express various preferences and criteria for release or
detention depending upon who-the police, the intake officer, or the court-is making the deci-
sion to release or detain the child. Id. STANDARDS 1.2, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 5.6, 6.6, 7.7.
70. Id. STANDARD 6.5(D)(2).
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such petition.71 A probable cause inquiry must be conducted as part of the
detention hearing,72 and the Standards provide that if probable cause has not
been judicially determined prior to the detention hearing, the hearing should
commence with consideration of that issue.
73
III. PROBABLE CAUSE AS A CONDITION FOR WAIVER OF JURISDICTION
The purpose of a waiver hearing is twofold: to determine whether there is
probable cause to believe the child has committed the alleged act, and, if so,
whether the child is amenable to treatment within the juvenile process.74 All
states, however, do not require a probable cause finding as a condition for
waiver.75 Such a finding is desirable and should be required for at least two
reasons. First, the waiver decision represents a critical stage of the proceed-
ings in juvenile court because it will determine whether the child, as preferred,
will be treated as a child in juvenile court, or will be prosecuted as an adult in
criminal court.76 The preference that a child be treated in juvenile court
rather than criminal court should only be overcome by substantial evidence
that the child has committed the act alleged and that he is not amenable to
treatment as a juvenile.
77
Second, a required probable cause finding is an essential safeguard
against prosecutorial overreaching. For example, the prosecutor might charge
a serious offense solely to qualify the case for transfer to criminal court, either
because of his desire to handle the case in criminal court or as an attempt to
intimidate the child into entering an admission to the offense charged, or to a
lesser offense, in juvenile court.78 The probable cause requirement assures
that the child's admission in juvenile court will not be accepted without a find-
ing of probable cause79 and that jurisdiction will not be waived unless the
court finds probable cause to believe the child committed the serious offense
charged. Without such a safeguard, in the latter instance a child's case might
71. Id. STANDARD 7.6(A).
72. Id. STANDARD 7.6(F).
73. Id. STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS, STANDARD 4.1.
74. See id. STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 2.2(A).
75. The reporters for the Juvenile Justice Standards indicate that only half of the states that
have waiver statutes require a finding of probable cause as a condition of waiver. Id. STANDARDS
RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 2.2, Commentary at 35. For examples of
statutes requiring such a finding, see GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-2501(a)(3)(i) (1976); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 61 (West Supp. 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-608 (Supp. 1979); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 27-20-34(l)(b)(4)(a) (Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2151.26(A)(2) (Page
1976); VA. CODE § 16.1-269(A)(3)(a) (Supp. 1979). In the absence of such a statutory requirement,
at least one court has held that a juvenile is not constitutionally entitled to a probable cause
determination in a waiver hearing. See In re Doe, 617 P.2d 830 (Hawaii App. 1980).
76. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556-57 (1966).
77. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BE-
TWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 2.2, Commentary at 35.
78. Id. A probable cause requirement as a means of controlling prosecutorial abuse is dis-
cussed in Part V of this Article.
79. See, ag., id. STANDARDS RELATING TO ADJUDICATION, STANDARDS, 1.1(B), 3.5; see also
id. STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION, STANDARD 5.3. The role of a probable cause re-
quirement in connection with plea discussions and acceptance of pleas is discussed in Part IV of
this Article.
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be transferred to criminal court where he might plead guilty to or be convicted
of a lesser offense over which the juvenile court would have had original,
nonwaivable jurisdiction.
80
Requiring a finding of probable cause as a condition for waiver of juris-
diction gives rise to consideration of two other issues: namely, the kind and
amount of evidence required to establish probable cause and the effect of a
probable cause finding on subsequent proceedings. With respect to the for-
mer, some courts have described the waiver hearing as dispositional rather
than adjudicatory in nature and have compared it to the preliminary hearing
in the criminal process.8 ' This view of the nature of a waiver hearing has
several procedural consequences. For example, the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard applicable to a delinquency adjudication is not required in a
waiver hearing. The standard of proof is generally a lesser standard, such as
preponderance of the evidence, 82 clear and convincing evidence,83 or substan-
tial evidence.84 Similarly, the rules of evidence in a waiver hearing generally
are relaxed in comparison to the applicable rules in an adjudicatory hearing.85
For example, a number of courts have held that hearsay or other incompetent
evidence is admissible in a waiver hearing.86 A waiver hearing, however, is
dispositional in nature only with respect to one of the determinations that have
to be made-whether the child is amenable to treatment as a juvenile. In
determining the amenability issue it is common for courts to consider psycho-
logical and social history reports that sometimes contain hearsay, just as such
evidence is considered at dispositional hearings following adjudication. Hear-
say or other incompetent evidence, however, should not be admissible to sup-
port a finding of probable cause. Some states so provide by statute.87 In
others, courts have held that while hearsay is admissible in a probable cause
hearing, due process of law demands that a probable cause finding not be
based solely on hearsay.
88
Perhaps because the waiver decision is a critical stage of the proceedings
in juvenile court89 and because the probable cause determination is an essen-
F0. See, ag., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5) (West Supp. 1980) (criminal court retains
jurisdiction over a case even if the child pleads guilty to or is convicted of a lesser offense over
which the juvenile court would have exercised original jurisdiction).
81. See, e.g., Vincent v. State, 349 So. 2d 1145, 1146 (Ala. 1977); People v. Taylor, 76 IlL. 2d
289, 302-04, 391 N.E.2d 366, 372-73 (1979); In re M.W.N, 590 P.2d 692, 694 (Okla. Crim. App.
1979).
82. See, eg., In re F.S., 586 P.2d 607, 611-12 (Alaska 1978).
83. See, eg., MAss. GEN. ANN. LAWS ch. 119, § 61 (West Supp. 1981).
84. See, e.g., In re G.L.W., 580 P.2d 998, 1002 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978).
85. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3)(a) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1979); id. § 705-1(1)
(Smith-Hurd 1972); see generally People v. Taylor, 76 IlL. 2d 289, 301-02, 391 N.E.2d 366, 371-72
(1979).
86. See, e.g., People v. Taylor, 76 II. 2d 289, 301-02, 391 N.E.2d 366, 371-72 (1979) (hear-
say); Marvin v. State, 603 P.2d 1056, 1060 (Nev. 1979) (illegally obtained evidence).
87. See, eg., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-609(c) (Supp. 1979).
88. See, e.g., People exrel Guggenheim v. Mucci, 77 Misc. 2d 41,44,352 N.Y.S.2d 561,565
(Sup. Ct. Kings Co.), af'd, 46 A.D.2d 683, 360 N.Y.S.2d 71 (1974).
89. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966).
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tial part of the waiver decision,90 the Juvenile Justice Standards take the posi-
tion that only evidence that would be admissible in an adjudicatory hearing is
admissible to support a finding of probable cause in a waiver hearing.91 In
contrast, the Standards provide that, on the issue of whether the child is ame-
nable to treatment as a juvenile, evidence is admissible that would be admissi-
ble at a dispositional hearing.92 This position is sound because it encourages
both reliable fact finding and judicial economy. Use of evidence that would
not be admissible in a subsequent delinquency hearing or criminal trial would
be a waste of time and effort.93 A number of states, for example, provide that
the applicable rules of evidence in delinquency proceedings are those that
would be applicable in criminal proceedings, 94 or they provide that evidence
in order to be admissible must be competent, relevant, and material.95 Courts
when called upon to decide the issue generally have held that the rules of
evidence, particularly the hearsay rule, are applicable to juvenile proceed-
ings. 96 Thus, if an adjudicatory hearing subsequently is held or the case is
transferred to criminal court for trial, and the evidence there consists wholely
or in substantial part of hearsay, adjudication or conviction cannot occur, or if
entered, cannot be sustained.
97
A case should not proceed to the adjudicatory stage or to the criminal
docket if probable cause, based on reliable evidence, has not been previously
established. Of course, hearsay is admissible if it falls within a recognized
exception to the hearsay rule, but such evidence would be admissible in the
subsequent adjudicatory hearing or criminal trial as well.98 Moreover, reliable
hearsay might be admissible in a waiver hearing to establish certain elements
on which no serious contest is presented,99 although if this reliable hearsay is
the only evidence that will be offered at trial with respect to the particular
element, it should not be admitted at the waiver hearing, for the reasons stated
above.
Assuming that a probable cause finding is required as a condition of
waiver, what is the effect of such a finding on subsequent criminal proceed-
90. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER
BETWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 2.2(A)(I).
91. Id. STANDARD 2.2(B).
92. Id. STANDARD 2.2(C).
93. Id. STANDARD 2.2(B), Commentary at 35-36.
94. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 701 (West Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 39.090)(b) (West Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-6 (Smith-Hurd 1972); IowA CODE
ANN. § 232.47(5) (West Supp. 1980); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-634(a)-(b) (Supp. 1979) (criminal
rules of evidence used unless issue is abuse, neglect, or dependency).
95. See, eg., D.C. CODE § 16-2316(b) (1973); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT. § 744(a) (McKinney
1975); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-226(b) (1978).
96. See, ag., In re Contreras, 109 Cal. App. 2d 787, 791, 241 P.2d 631, 634 (1952); In re
M.L.H., 399 A.2d 556, 558 (D.C. 1979); In re Johnson, 214 Kan. 780, 784, 522 P.2d 330, 334
(1974); In re Ross, 45 Wash. 2d 654, 655-56, 277 P.2d 335, 336-37 (1954); see also Garner v. Wood,
188 Ga. 463, 4 S.E.2d 137, 140 (1939); In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 520, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999,
1001 (Fain. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1975).
97. See, ag., In re M.L.H., 399 A.2d 556 (D.C. 1979).
98. See, eg., In re Kevin G., 80 Misc. 2d 517, 363 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Faro. Ct., N.Y. Co. 1975).
99. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-609(c)(2) (Supp. 1979).
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ings? Some states specifically provide that a finding of probable cause in a
juvenile waiver hearing is sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of
the resulting criminal prosecution. 00 The better view, however, is that a prob-
able cause finding in a juvenile proceeding should not be substituted for a
probable cause finding in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The Juvenile
Justice Standards, for example, provide:
A finding of probable cause to believe that a juvenile has committed
a class one juvenile offense may be substituted for a probable cause
determination relating to that offense (or a lesser included offense)
required in any subsequent juvenile court proceeding. Such a find-
ing should not be substituted for any finding of probable cause re-
quired in any subsequent criminal proceeding. 0 1
There are several reasons why this approach is desirable. First, a prelimi-
nary hearing in criminal court is a useful discovery device, and a child should
not be denied this additional opportunity to learn the nature of the evidence
against him. Second, the child may have conceded the finding of probable
cause in the waiver hearing in order to focus on the nonamenability condition
for waiver. 102 Third, because of the strong preference that a child be treated
within the juvenile justice system and the consequent critical importance of
the waiver determination, a child should be given every possible opportunity
to show that he should not be tried as an adult. For example, under Texas
statutes a child has three stages at which his status is reviewed. First, if his
case qualifies for waiver consideration, he is entitled to a waiver hearing in
juvenile court. Second, if jurisdiction is waived and the case is transferred to
criminal court, he is entitled to an "examining trial" (preliminary hearing) for
the purpose of determining whether the criminal court should retain jurisdic-
tion or transfer the case back to juvenile court. Third, if the criminal court as
a result of the examining trial binds the case over for action by the grand jury
and the grand jury fails to indict the child, the criminal court so certifies and
transfers the case back to juvenile court.' 0 3
Under this procedure a child enjoys rights greater than those of adults. In
Texas a criminal defendant is entitled to an examining trial, but if an indict-
ment is returned prior to an examining trial, the indictment terminates the
right to an examining trial. 1°4 For a juvenile, however, the right to an examin-
ing trial following transfer from juvenile court appears to be absolute. Texas
courts have held void indictments returned against a child before his examin-
ing trial has been held in criminal court' 05 Moreover, the courts have held
that when the criminal court, as a result of the examining trial, finds the evi-
100. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-6-2-4(g) (Burns 1980).
101. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BE-
TWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 2.2(D).
102. Id. Commentary at 42.
103. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 3, § 54.02 (Vernon 1975 & Supp. 1980); Menefee v. State,
561 S.W.2d 822 (rex. Crim. App. 1977).
104. White v. State, 576 S.W.2d 843, 844 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
105. See, eg., id. at 845.
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dence insufficient to establish probable cause and dismisses the complaint, a
subsequent indictment by the grand jury is void.106
This Texas scheme should serve as a model. The desirability of a proba-
ble cause requirement as a condition of waiver and the reasons therefor al-
ready have been stated. If the decision is made to transfer the case to criminal
court, a second probable cause hearing should be held in criminal court. The
criminal court should not be bound by the probable cause finding entered in
the juvenile court's transfer order but rather should conduct a de novo proba-
ble cause hearing. If as a result of this hearing the court determines that prob-
able cause is lacking, the case should be dismissed. If the court determines
that the evidence is insufficient to support the serious charge qualifying the
case for waiver, but is sufficient to support a lesser offense over which the
juvenile court would have original jurisdiction, the case should be transferred
back to the juvenile court for adjudication. Even if the court determines that
probable cause to support the serious offense is established and binds the case
over to the grand jury, the grand jury should not be bound by any of the
previous probable cause findings. The grand jury should be free to return a
finding of no probable cause.107
One final matter is worthy of note. If a waiver hearing is held and the
court determines that probable cause has not been established and dismisses
the proceeding, no reason appears why a subsequent waiver hearing cannot be
held with respect to the same offense, if additional evidence to support proba-
ble cause has been obtained. Giving approval to such a procedure, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts added as a precaution that the court
should exercise care in determining whether fairness precludes a subsequent
probable cause hearing when a substantial lapse of time has occurred between
the times of the respective hearings.
10 8
IV. PROBABLE CAUSE AS A CONDITION FOR ACCEPTANCE OF GUILTY
PLEAS OR ADMISSIONS
The principal concern in this and in the immediately following section is
the possibility of prosecutorial abuse and how best to avoid or minimize it.
The specific problems discussed here are: (1) the possibility that the prosecu-
tor might charge a serious offense that will qualify the case for transfer to
criminal court, solely for the purpose of obtaining a child's admission (guilty
plea) to a lesser offense that will be handled in juvenile court, and (2) the
possibility that the prosecutor might charge a serious offense that is excluded
from the juvenile court's jurisdiction, solely for the purpose of having the child
prosecuted as an adult, and, in that event, the propriety of the criminal court's
acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense over which the juvenile court
106. See, e.g., Exparte Spencer, 579 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
107. If the grand jury chooses to return an indictment after the criminal court has determined
that the evidence is insufficient to support probable cause, the indictment is void under Texas
procedure. Id.
108. A Juvenile v. Commonwealth, 374 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Mass. 1978).
1981]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
would have had original jurisdiction. Of course, in the latter example, the
prosecutor might act in good faith in charging the serious offense, although the
problem of the criminal court's acceptance of the guilty plea remains.
One response to the first problem might be to prohibit plea bargaining in
juvenile proceedings altogether, as some states have done.' 0 9 Another re-
sponse might be to allow plea bargaining, but only under carefully controlled
circumstances. This approach seems to offer the most hope of controlling orminimizing the possibility of abuse. In Iowa, for example, plea agreements are
allowed, 110 but the statute sets forth numerous safeguards. The plea can con-
sist, on the state's part, of charge concessions or sentence (disposition) conces-
sions in the sense that a particular disposition will be recommended.", The
statute requires the court to address the child personally to determine whether
the plea is freely and voluntarily made and whether the child understands the
consequences of the plea. 1 2 If the court learns through inquiry that the plea is
made pursuant to a plea agreement, the terms must be disclosed in court. 1
13 If
the terms consist of an agreement to recommend that certain charges be dis-
missed or that a certain disposition be ordered, the court must indicate
whether or not it will concur in the recommendation." 14 If the court indicates
that it will not concur in the recommendation for dismissal or disposition, or if
it defers judgment on a recommended disposition until review of a predisposi-
tion report, it must so inform the child, and state that it is not bound by the
plea agreement and that disposition of the case may be less favorable than that
contemplated by the plea agreement."l 5 The child then is given an opportu-
nity to withdraw the plea. 16 Finally, before acceptance of the plea the court
must determine whethet there is a factual basis for the plea.' 
17
The requirement that there be a factual basis for a plea is crucial to con-
trolling the possibility of abuse. The Juvenile Justice Standards, for example,
also allow plea agreements, 18 but they provide that the prosecutor should not
enter into or continue discussions if he is aware of a claim of factual innocence
109. See, e.g., Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-21-555 (Supp. 1980).
110. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.43 (West Supp. 1980).
1l1. Id. § 232.43(2).
112. Id. § 232.43(3); accord, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-633(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Iowa
and North Carolina statutory requirements are very similar to those set forth by the Supreme
Court in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), for acceptance of guilty pleas in criminal pro-
ceedings. A number of state courts have applied the requirements of Boykin to juvenile proceed-
ings in connection with the court's acceptance of a child's admission of the allegations of the
petition. See, e.g., In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. J-86715, 122 Ariz. 300, 594 P.2d
554 (Ct. App. 1979); In re James K., 47 A.D. 2d 946, 367 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1975) (per curiam); In re
Chavis, 31 N.C. App. 579, 230 S.E.2d 198 (1976), cert. denied, 291 N.C. 711, 232 S.E.2d 203 (1977).
113. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.43(4) (West Supp. 1980); accord, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-633(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1979).
114. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.43(4) (West Supp. 1980).
115. Id.
116. Id. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-633(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
117. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.43(5)(a) (West Supp. 1980). The statute thus rejects the premise
of North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31-39 (1970), that a guilty plea may be accepted even
when accompanied by a claim of innocence. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-633(c) (Cum. Supp.
1979).
118. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO PROSECUTION,
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by the child." 19 The Standards go further, however, and require that sufficient
evidence, independent of the child's plea, be presented in the record to show
that the plea is accurate, that is, that the child committed the act or acts alleged
in the petition. 120 More importantly, the Standards require the prosecutor to
present sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that the child commit-
ted the act or acts alleged in the petition, at the child's first appearance in
court, whether such appearance is a detention hearing, a waiver hearing, or
some other preliminary hearing.'
21
The required showing of probable cause is the greatest deterrent to
prosecutorial abuse. If the prosecutor is aware that he will have to show by
reliable evidence that the child probably has committed an act at least as seri-
ous as the act alleged in the petition, he will be discouraged from alleging a
more serious offense than the evidence will support, for the purpose of ob-
taining the child's admission to a lesser offense, or for whatever purpose.
Similar considerations apply to the second problem-the possibility that
the prosecutor might charge a serious offense that is excluded from the juve-
nile court's jurisdiction solely for the purpose of having the case handled in
criminal court. The immediate solution is that no offenses should be excluded
from the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Rather, if a case is to be handled as a
criminal case, the decision should be made by the juvenile court through the
normal waiver process. Nevertheless, a number of states do exclude certain
offenses from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 122 In these states adequate
safeguards against prosecutorial abuse will have to be present in the criminal
process, as the case will never be presented in juvenile court at all. A similar
probable cause requirement should be imposed on the prosecutor in the crimi-
nal court. Before the criminal court can assume jurisdiction over the serious
offense alleged, the prosecutor should have to establish probable cause to be-
lieve that the child has committed an offense at least as serious as the one
charged. If the evidence, rather than showing probable cause to support the
serious charge, shows probable cause to believe the child has committed a
lesser offense over which the juvenile court would have had original jurisdic-
tion, the criminal court should transfer the case to juvenile court for handling.
A jurisdictional problem is presented, however. May the criminal court
retain jurisdiction over the lesser offense to accept the child's plea of guilty or
to go to trial on the lesser offense? In Louisiana, for example, statutory law
provides that if a serious criminal charge excluded from the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court is filed in criminal court, the criminal court can retain jurisdic-
tion in the case, even if the child pleads guilty to or is convicted of a lesser
STANDARD 5.1. The Standards provide, however, that the prosecutor cannot promise to recom-
mend a particular disposition as part of a plea agreement. Id. STANDARD 5.1(A).
119. Id. STANDARD 5.2.
120. Id. STANDARD 5.3.
121. Id. STANDARD 4.6.
122. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-1-103(9)(b) (1978); DEL.. CODE tit. 10, §§ 921(2)(a),
938(a)(1) (1974 & Supp. 1980); LA. REv. STAT. AN. § 13.1570(A)(5) (West Supp. 1980); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 7A-608 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
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offense over which the juvenile court would have had original jurisdiction.1
23
This type of statute presents a clear potential for abuse. If the child has to be
over a certain age and be charged with a serious offense, the prosecutor could
delay filing the charge until the child reaches the necessary age.' 24 If certain
offenses are excluded from the juvenile court's jurisdiction without regard to
the age of the child, the prosecutor could charge such an offense even though
the evidence will show at most commission of a lesser offense.
Although these deliberate decisions by the prosecutor, made solely to
avoid the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, might constitute a denial of due
process of law, they can be controlled to a large extent by statutory provisions
existing in most states. In an Oregon case, for example, in which the prosecu-
tor deliberately delayed seeking an indictment until after defendant reached
eighteen years of age solely to avoid a waiver hearing in juvenile court, the
court held that such a practice was in violation of statutes allocating jurisdic-
tion between the criminal and juvenile courts and remanded the case to the
criminal court to transfer the case to juvenile court for a waiver hearing. 125
At the very least, these practices frustrate the intent of the juvenile court
jurisdictional statutes. If the legislature has made the judgment that in certain
kinds of cases the preference for treatment of a child in juvenile court is over-
come by other considerations, such as the seriousness of the offense or the age
of the child or both, such judgment should be given effect. Whether an offense
is excluded from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or simply qualifies a case
for waiver of jurisdiction, if it appears for any reason that the child has com-
mitted a lesser offense, giving effect to legislative intent would seem to require
that the case be handled initially as a juvenile matter.1 26 Thus, a required
probable cause hearing in criminal court would serve as a screening device to
determine which cases properly should result in criminal prosecution and
which properly should be transferred to juvenile court for adjudication.
V. PROBABLE CAUSE AS AN ELEMENT IN
DETERMINING PROPER JURISDICTION
Except in states where the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses committed by children, when a child is taken into custody for or
otherwise formally charged with commission of a delinquent act, an initial
decision to be reached is whether the child's case should be handled in juve-
nile court or treated as a criminal matter. Prosecutors often have enormous
discretion to determine the court-juvenile or criminal-in which a child's
case will be handled. Such prosecutorial discretion occurs in many forms.
123. LA. Rev. STAT. ANN. § 13:1570(A)(5) (West Supp. 1980). Under the statute, children
who are charged with murder, manslaughter, or aggravated rape after reaching 15 years of age or
armed robbery, aggravated burglary, or aggravated kidnapping after reaching 16 years of age are
not subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Id.
124. The Louisiana statute is ambiguous as to whether the child must have been 15 at the time
of commission of the alleged act or at the time he is charged with the offense. See Id.




First, some states by statute expressly authorize the prosecutor to make this
jurisdictional decision, either with respect to all children charged with an of-
fense12 7 or only those who are in an older age group or charged with a serious
offense.1 28 Second, some states exclude certain offenses from the juvenile
court's jurisdiction,129 and the prosecutor can elect to handle a case as a crimi-
nal matter by charging such an offense. Third, some states grant the criminal
court original jurisdiction over certain offenses with authorization to transfer
appropriate cases to the juvenile court for handling.130 By charging such an
offense, the prosecutor can elect to have the case treated initially as a criminal
matter. Finally, some states provide for concurrent jurisdiction between the
juvenile and criminal courts over certain offenses, 131 and the prosecutor can
opt in favor of criminal prosecution by filing a charge in criminal court or by
seeking an indictment.
The preferable solution is to permit none of these options but rather to
grant the juvenile court original jurisdiction over all offenses committed by
children, with the option of waiving jurisdiction and transferring certain cases
to the criminal court. A system of judicial waiver places decision-making re-
sponsibility in the agency best equipped to make such dispositional deci-
sions. 132 More importantly, because of the requirement of a waiver hearing
attendant with certain rights as announced in Kent v. United States,133 the
decision will be made at a level of high visibility. In contrast, if the prosecutor
in his sole discretion decides whether the case is to be handled as a juvenile or
an adult matter, the decision is made at a level of low visibility with great
potential for abuse.
Given the fact of prosecutorial discretion, however, the issue becomes one
127. See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-6-203(c), 14-6-211 (1978).
128. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 45-418 (Supp. 1979) (children 15 or older arrested without a
warrant); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202.01 (1978) (children alleged to have committed an offense over
which the juvenile and criminal courts exercise concurrent jurisdiction).
129. See statutes cited in note 122 supra.
130. See, e.g., MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-804(d)(1), (4) (1980); MD. ANN. CODE
art. 27, § 594A (Supp. 1980); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 43-21-105(j), 43-21-159(3) (Supp. 1980); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT. § 712(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10(18), 30 (McKinney
Supp. 1980); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75, 190.71, 210.43, 220.10(5)(g) (McKinney Supp.
1980); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1104.2 (West Supp. 1980); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6302,
6322(a) (Purdon 1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 632(a)(1) (Supp. 1980).
131. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-417, 45-418, 45-420 (1977 & Supp. 1979); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 39.02(5)(c) (West Supp. 1980); GA. CODE ANN. § 24A-301(b) (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 712A.2(d) (Supp. 1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-202(3)(b)-(c) (1978); S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. § 26-11-3 (1976); Wyo. STAT. §§ 14-6-203(c), 14-6-211 (1978).
132. The juvenile court, rather than any other court, has the superior resources, the procedural
mechanism (the waiver hearing), and the experience in dealing with children and their problems
to make such decisions. See generally Whitebread & Batey, Transfer Between Courts: Proposals of
the Juvenile Justice Standards Project, 63 VA. L. REV. 221 (1977). Allowing the juvenile court,
rather than another court, to make the jurisdictional decision also gives effect to the preference
that cases involving children should be handled as juvenile matters and only the exceptional cases
treated as criminal matters. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 7A-523, -524 (Supp 1979); JUVENILE JUS-
TICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER BETWEEN COURTS, STAN-
DARDS 1.1(C), 2.2(B), Commentary at 17-19, 35.
133. 383 U.S. 541, 552-53 (1966) (right to counsel, access to social records and probation re-
ports and reasons for juvenile court's decision).
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of what safeguards, if any, can be utilized to minimize the risk of abuse. The
experience in the courts has been discouraging. For example, under Florida
law, jurisdiction over all persons under eighteen accused of crimes is generally
vested in the juvenile court; however, if a child is alleged to have committed
an offense punishable by death or life imprisonment, jurisdiction is vested in
the criminal court if the child is indicted for such offense by the grand jury.1
3 4
In effect, this gives the prosecutor discretion to determine the court in which
the child will be handled. The constitutionality of the Florida statute was
challenged by a child who claimed his conviction was invalid because he was
subjected to criminal prosecution as an adult without the benefit of a waiver
hearing in juvenile court, as required by due process of law under Kent. The
Fifth Circuit rejected this claim on the ground that the requirements of Kent,
particularly the hearing requirement, apply only to the judicial decision-mak-
ing process and not to discretionary prosecutorial decisions to proceed against
a child as an adult by presenting a case to the grand jury. 135
Under former Illinois law the prosecutor made the decision whether to
handle a case in juvenile court or bring a criminal prosecution against the
child. Because the former statute did not require a hearing, the Illinois courts
held that a hearing was not required by Kent because a decision under the old
law did not involve a matter of judicial determination. 136 For identical rea-
sons, the Fourth Circuit held that under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency
Act, which formerly gave the Attorney General discretion to prosecute a case
as a criminal matter, no hearing was required. 137 In light of these decisions, it
is interesting to note that the Illinois and federal acts have since been amended
to abrogate prosecutorial discretion in favor of a judicial waiver hearing as the
exclusive means of determining which cases are appropriate for criminal pros-
ecution.1
38
Under New York law the criminal court is given original jurisdiction over
children over a certain age charged with certain serious enumerated offenses,
although this criminal jurisdiction can be waived and any such case trans-
ferred to juvenile court for adjudication. 139 This scheme employs a kind of
reverse waiver, placing in the criminal court decision-making responsibility as
to whether a case is to be treated as a juvenile matter or a criminal matter.
The prosecutor shares in this decision-making power, as he elects whether to
charge a child with one of the enumerated offenses and because, in most in-
stances, removal to juvenile court can be ordered only with his consent. The
New York scheme was upheld against a claim, based on statutory and due
134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.02(5)(c) (West Supp. 1979).
135. Woodard v. Wainwright, 556 F.2d 781, 786 (5th Cir. 1977); accord, Russell v. Parratt, 543
F.2d 1214 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Bland, 472 F.2d 1329 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rejecting similar
claims made against the Nebraska and District of Columbia statutory procedures, respectively.
136. People v. Sprinkle, 56 III. 2d 257, 263, 307 N.E.2d 161, 164 (1974).
137. Cox v. United States, 473 F.2d 334, 335-36 (4th Cir. 1973).
138. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032 (1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-7(3) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1980).
139. N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 712(a)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1980); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 10(18), 30




process grounds, that the criminal court's exercise of jurisdiction was improper
when no hearing was held to determine whether the case should have been
transferred to juvenile court, in Vega v. Bell.140 The court pointed out that in
only one instance, when a child is arrested and arraigned before the criminal
court prior to grand jury action, is he entitled to a hearing, and the hearing is
one to determine probable cause pending action by the grand jury.
14 1
There seems to be little support under decisional law for the view that the
same kinds of procedural safeguards required by due process in connection
with a waiver hearing are applicable to discretionary decisions of a prosecutor.
Policy, however, favors the creation of certain safeguards. An underlying
premise of the juvenile court is that children as a rule ought to be treated
differently from adults and that as a rule they ought to be handled in the
juvenile court rather than the criminal court. Only the exceptional cases
should be processed in the criminal court.
14 2
The Supreme Court recognized in Kent that a judicial waiver decision is
of critical importance in proceedings against a child because it determines
whether he will forego treatment as a child and instead be subjected to the
more punitive processes of a criminal prosecution. 143 For this reason the deci-
sion-making process must be attended by certain procedural safeguards. The
underlying importance of the decision is not diminished simply because,
rather than being judicial in nature, it is made by the prosecutor. Yet, when
the prosecutor makes such a decision his discretion is largely unfettered in the
absence of some kind of procedural safeguard.
As discussed in the preceding section, at the very least the criminal court
should be required to hold a hearing at which the prosecutor must establish
probable cause to believe the child has committed the offense charged in crim-
inal court. Under New York procedure, for example, if a child charged with
an offense over which the criminal court has original jurisdiction is arraigned
prior to grand jury action, he is entitled to a probable cause hearing.
144 If
probable cause supporting the serious offense is shown, the case is bound over
for grand jury action.145 If probable cause to support a lesser offense over
which the juvenile court would have exercised original jurisdiction is shown,
the case is transferred to the juvenile court. 146 If no probable cause is found,
140. 47 N.Y.2d 543, 550, 393 N.E.2d 450, 454, 419 N.Y.S.2d 454, 459 (1979). But cf. State ex
rel Coats v. Johnson, 597 P.2d 328, 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (Cornish, P.J., concurring) (in
addition to unconstitutional vagueness ground, statutes granting criminal court original jurisdic-
tion over certain offenses with discretion to transfer to juvenile court are invalid on ground they
create a constitutionally impermissible presumption of competency to commit crime).
141. 47 N.Y.2d at 552, 393 N.E.2d at 455, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 460. See N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW
§ 180.75(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
142. See JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, supra note 9, STANDARDS RELATING TO TRANSFER
BETWEEN COURTS, STANDARD 1.1, Commentary at 13-19; see generally State v. Scurlock, 286 Or.
277, 593 P.2d 1159 (1979).
143. 383 U.S. at 556-57.
144. N.Y. CRIm. PROC. LAW §§ 180.75(l)-(3) (McKinney Supp. 1980).
145. Id. § 180.75(3).
146. Id.
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the case is dismissed. 147 As a minimal safeguard, this kind of procedure
should be followed in all cases in which a child is brought before a criminal
court as a result of prosecutorial discretion or as a result of the criminal court
having exclusive, original, or concurrent jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Furthermore, in states granting original jurisdiction to the criminal court
over certain kinds of offenses, with authority to transfer exceptional cases to
the juvenile court, more should be required. These "reverse waiver" proce-
dures should be attended by the same procedural safeguards required in a
judicial waiver determination in juvenile court. Specifically, a waiver hearing
should be required, and the child should have the same rights in this hearing
that Kent guarantees in juvenile waiver proceedings.
The importance of the decision to the child is the same. In a juvenile
waiver proceeding the juvenile court cannot arbitrarily determine which cases
are exceptional and ought to be handled in criminal court. Likewise, the crim-
inal court should not be allowed arbitrarily to determine which cases are ex-
ceptional and ought to be handled in juvenile court. In each case the
presumption as to how children should be treated is reversed, but the result of
the decision-making process is the same-some children are treated as
juveniles and some are subjected to criminal prosecution. Such a decision,
regardless of the court in which it is made, should be subject to the procedural
safeguards required by Kent. Indeed, a reverse waiver procedure in the ab-
sence of sufficient safeguards may create a constitutionally impermissible pre-
sumption of competency to commit crime. 148
VI. CONCLUSION
A probable cause requirement performs desirable, and often necessary,
functions at different stages of proceedings against children in both juvenile
and criminal court. In juvenile court it has a role to play during the initial
stages in determination of whether a petition should be filed, and, ultimately,
in the determination of the legal sufficiency of the petition itself, a determina-
tion that is made by the court. When special provisions dealing with release
are applicable, probable cause also has a role to play in determining whether a
child can be lawfully detained pending an adjudicatory hearing. Additionally,
the probable cause requirement is an essential limitation on prosecutorial dis-
cretion and is a safeguard against potential abuse. It can operate to discourage
overcharging designed to persuade the child to enter an admission to a lesser
offense in juvenile court or to qualify the case for transfer to criminal court or,
indeed, to have the case originate in criminal court or fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the criminal court.
The Juvenile Justice Standards in particular emphasize the importance of
the probable cause inquiry for a number of purposes, and by providing for its
147. Id.
148. See State ex rel. Coats v. Johnson, 597 P.2d 328, 330 (Okla. Crim. App. 1979) (Cornish,
P.J., concurring).
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use at various stages of the proceedings the Standards encourage judicial de-
termination of probable cause at the earliest stage possible. Because the Stan-
dards are concerned only with procedures applicable in the juvenile justice
process, however, more is needed to protect the jurisdictional integrity of the
juvenile court and the rights of children generally against potential abuse.
Specifically, when under applicable law cases in which certain offenses are
charged originate in criminal court or are within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the criminal court, a probable cause inquiry in the criminal proceedings
should be employed to assure that the case is properly before the criminal
court in the first instance. Only then can the underlying premise of the Stan-
dards-that children are entitled to treatment in juvenile court, unless sub-
stantial evidence indicates otherwise-be effectuated.

